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In ways unimaginable just a few years ago, public banking and its potential 
for catalysing transition to a green and just future has been catapulted to the 
centre of political and economic debate. The reasons for this resurgent interest 
in public banks are anything but auspicious. The greed-driven excesses of Wall 
Street and global finance gave rise to the 2008-09 global financial crisis—the 
most costly financial crisis in the history of humanity. This same drive to accu-
mulate more and more capital has given rise to a second crisis—a global crisis 
of climate finance. 
The global financial crisis and global crisis of climate finance are 
interrelated insofar as they are the product of neoliberal capi-
talism, which is premised on the ideology that competitive, 
profit-seeking behaviour can resolve all problems, be 
they economic, political, social, and indeed environmen-
tal. Competitive behaviours in the market and in the 
household have driven rampant consumerism, further 
enabled by the levers of finance offering seemingly 
limitless access to debt in order to consume anything 
now, be it multiple homes to speculate on or the latest 
smartphone.
There are 30,000 financial institutions around the world im-
plicated in this social process. Most of these are private, which 
combined control 80 per cent of all banking assets. Despite having far 
greater numbers and assets than public banks, private banks are not pulling 
their relative weight in climate finance. Of the $454 billion in climate finance in-
vested in 2016, private investors contributed $230 billion and the public sector 
$224 billion (Oliver et al. 2018, 2). That is, with only 20 per cent of total assets 
public banks invest nearly as much as all private banks combined. The short-
term, return-maximising horizons of private finance have failed, utterly, to drive 
anything like a green transition. The future of climate finance must look to the 
public sphere, not the private (cf. Steinfort and Kishimoto 2019).
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3We must also ensure that the green transition is just. The crises of global fi-
nance and climate finance have to date been resolved under capitalism by 
letting the costs fall disproportionately onto workers, women, racialised com-
munities, and the most marginalised in society—either through the direct 
bailouts of large corporations and private banks or through the knock-on 
socioeconomic impacts of austerity. The vast majority of people face stagnat-
ing or falling wages, rising job insecurity and anti-labour practices, the retreat 
of public provisioning of essential services, skyrocketing inequality of wealth 
and opportunity, and persistent racism and sexism. These injustices prevail as 
competitive and consumerist human activities feed climate change and global 
warming. Societies will have to deal with rising sea levels and extreme weath-
er conditions that will foster recurrent waves of mass migration and economic 
hardship. There will obviously be increased burden on our natural environment, 
from the coral reefs to the carbon sinks of vast forests and wetlands. The built 
environment will also come under new and growing threats as we struggle as 
a society to refurbish existing stocks while maintaining and upgrading public 
services and infrastructure as we move to a zero-carbon emissions future. All of 
this will require massive investments and societal change. 
Under neoliberal capitalism these challenges will necessarily 
be faced unequally and unjustly. The most marginalised 
will bear the brunt of transition by virtue of existing 
structural barriers and in-built systems of oppression. 
Faith in market-oriented ‘green growth’ and entrepre-
neurial innovation strategies will entrench pre-existing 
power structures. What is urgently required is strategy 
and action on a green and just transition for all. Therein, 
democratized finance will be key. Low-carbon infrastruc-
ture needs constructing, local jobs protecting, fossil fuels 
need to remain in the ground, the planet needs cooling, and 
social equity needs action. 
Yet there is no hope of this type of green and just transition without financial 
institutions that can be democratically commanded to function in the public 
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4interest. Put otherwise, democratized public finance is a necessary, if by no 
means sufficient, condition of a green and just transition. It is in the search for 
such financial alternatives that public banking has once more captured people’s 
imagination. 
It is for this reason that we propose the creation of a democratized US Green 
Investment Bank (GIB). A democratized GIB has the potential to catalyse a 
transition to a socially just and environmentally sustainable future that is other-
wise impossible under the short-term, high-return regime of private financiers 
(regardless of the extent of their financial resources). The GIB’s potential is, of 
course, only realizable within a grander strategy of socioeconomic transforma-
tion, such as is envisioned within the Green New Deal. The proposed design of 
a new GIB is meant to fit strategically within this evolving framework. Its po-
tential depends on the GIB catalysing structural change in the public interest. 
To be in the public interest, a new GIB needs to function in accordance with a 
triple bottom line aimed at (1) a green and just transition; (2) financial sus-
tainability; (3) and democratic decision-making. In the absence of a legally 
binding triple bottom line in the public interest, any green transition or new 
deal strategy will be hijacked by private interests, financial capital, and gov-
erning elites—all of whom can only promise more concentrated wealth, greater 
social inequality, and accelerated environmental devastation.
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5We elaborate on this proposal in four sections: the possibility of creating a GIB 
in the US; its sustainable design; connecting it to local banks and communities; 
and democratizing it. This is followed by a brief conclusion. It is worth taking 
note that each function discussed is drawn from already-existing public banks.
One last thing: It is important when reading this proposal that you see it as 
the start of a conversation, a debate, over the kind of financial institution that 
can be geared towards the interests of the many, not the few. Our intention, as 
such, in preparing this paper is not to conclude but contribute to the discussion 
over perhaps one of the most important struggles of our time—the struggle to 
democratize finance for a green and just transition.
I. Creating a US Green Investment Bank for All
Public banks already exist and persist in the USA and around the world. These 
examples offer important and viable precedents that can inform the creation of 
a new public Green Investment Bank in the US. The realisation of a new public 
bank, however, will depend on political will and popular demand. The first steps 
have already been taken in the Green New Deal’s call for public banking sup-
port [Section 4(A)].
The concept of a public investment or development bank is hardly novel and 
by no means isolated. Public banks persist despite 40 years of neoliberal advo-
cates demanding their privatization. According to numbers provided by Orbis/
Bankscope, the most comprehensive electronic database of banks, there are 
693 banks globally that are majority publicly owned.1 From Canada to China, 
Australia to Argentina, public banks have combined assets of $37.72 trillion. 
As a percentage of all global bank assets, public and private, this constitutes 
20 per cent of the total, a figure that equates to 48 per cent of 2017 glob-
al GDP. Moreover, specialized credit institutions (i.e., public investment and 
development banks) like the proposed GIB make up nearly half of all these 
public assets (47 per cent). Public banks, that is, have already-existing, geo-
graphically disperse, and massive financial resources. In recognition of their 
6already-existing capacity, the 2015 United Nations Addis Ababa Finance for De-
velopment Conference concluded that public development banks should play 
an increased role in achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.2 Fur-
thermore, a 2018 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report 
recommends that public development banks increase their often-conservative 
lending practices (UNCTAD 2018).
It is often assumed that public banks are restricted to the “developing” world. 
But there are significant examples of public banks within jurisdictions very simi-
lar to the United States. In Canada, the province of Alberta created the Alberta 
Treasury Branch (ATB) in 1938 to assist farmers, and it is a public bank that 
persists today. As recently as in 2017, the Canadian Federal Government found-
ed the new Canada Infrastructure Bank. There are even more cases of new 
public banks being formed in Europe (where there is an already long-stand-
ing tradition of public banking). In 2013 France created a new investment and 
infrastructure public bank, the SFIL, to add to its already-existing public bank-
ing mix (see Box 1). Since 2000 Germany has created at least nine new public 
regional and municipal investment banks (VÖB 2014). 
It is hardly the case that public banks are simply foreign to the United States. 
The history of public banks in the US can be traced back to the late 17th centu-
ry (Brown 2019, 140). Various colonial governments experimented with public 
BOX 1: FRENCH PUBLIC BANKS, OLD AND NEW
Two French public banks, one old (the Caisse des Dépôts, established 1816) and one 
new, the BPI France (established 2012), are helping to lead France’s climate mitigation 
strategy. Guided by national legislation, the National Low Carbon Strategy (SNBC) 
and the Multiannual Energy Plan (PPE), these public banks’ climate investments in-
clude everything from household retrofitting (including in social housing) to large scale 
renewable energy projects and transportation infrastructure projects. The funding 
provided is often at concessional rates or through non-repayable grants and transfers. 
Since 2013, France’s public sector, including the central government and its public 
banks, has provided more than half of the country’s total climate mitigation invest-
ments (I4CE 2017, 4). In 2018 alone, French public banks offered $4.9 billion in climate 
finance (I4CE 2018, 12). 
7land banks to promote trade and agriculture. They were understood to be vital 
for a healthy economic structure. Public banks also helped the colonial govern-
ment meet the expenses of treaties with Native Americans and with financing 
public buildings in Pennsylvania (Thayer 1953). These early experiences did not 
prevail. Public banks in the US did not re-emerge until the early 20th century. 
The best-known public bank in the US is the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion (RFC), which was modelled after the War Finance Corporation. The RFC 
was formed in 1932, amidst the Great Depression, to help commercial lending 
recover by injecting fresh liquidity into the banking sector (Nash 1959; Fishback 
2007). Despite its initial aim, the bank progressively expanded its operations 
during the Roosevelt administration and became an essential financial source 
for many New Deal Programs. Starting up with a capital stock of $500 million, 
the RFC mainly used funds it borrowed from the Treasury. “By the mid-1930s, 
the RFC was making loans to banks, savings banks, building and loan associa-
tions, credit unions, railroads, industrial banks, farmers, commercial businesses, 
federal land banks, production credit associations, farm cooperatives, mort-
gage loan companies, insurance companies, school districts, and livestock 
credit corporations” (Olson 1988, 43-44). The bank used its returns from repaid 
loans to offer new credit. Having disbursed more than $40 billion, it ended its 
operations in 1957 (Secretary of the Treasury 1959). The experiences of the US 
New Deal offer important precedent, and financial insight, into what is possible 
for the Green New Deal and for a new GIB.
The dissolution of the RFC did not mean the end of public banking in the Unit-
ed States. Originally established to support industrialization and farmers 100 
years ago in 1919 (as the Alberta Treasury Branch did to the north), the Bank 
of North Dakota still supports commerce and industry and remains in partner-
ship with dozens of local financial institutions to make loans to businesses (see 
Brown 2019, 142). The BND invests deposits back into the state’s own economy 
and contributes to the state budget by paying handsome dividends (see Moth-
er Jones 2009). 
8There are other examples of contemporary public banks in the USA. For exam-
ple, the North American Development Bank (NADB) was established in 1994 
by the governments of Mexico and the United States to serve the communities 
north and south of the border. In addition to financing infrastructural projects, 
the NADB provides technical assistance to the local communities for project 
planning and design. In addition, the US has had an export-import bank to 
support American businesses since 1934. Backed by the federal government, 
the Ex-Im Bank provides financial services to reduce risks of exporting corpo-
rations. There is also a strong tradition of community owned banks and hybrid 
banks. For example, owned mainly by the tribal nations and Alaska native 
corporations, the Native American Bank (est. 2001) aims to provide financial 
services to native communities. 
A vibrant, community-driven yet nationwide public banking movement, which 
recognizes the value of public banking, has emerged since the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. There are ongoing campaigns at the municipal and state-level 
to create new publicly owned banks based on their successful track records in 
North Dakota and elsewhere. Motivations include the fact that public banks can 
provide cheap credits and stable funding to reinvigorate local and state-level 
economies. As of 2018, there were 15 bills in the US seeking the foundation of 
public banks in cities and the states.3
Public banks in the US, throughout their history, have shown variations in both 
their structure and social content. Be it coping with the financial hurdles in 
newly founded colonies or providing financial relief by supporting businesses 
as well as social programs amidst economic depression, the major motives in 
the creation of a public bank change over time. Public banking capacity, how-
ever, will be critical for furthering a socially progressive agenda and public 
banks are potential strongholds to support the public good. Despite the vari-
ation in their creation processes and social priorities, the establishment of all 
public banks depends on political will for holding up public interest and these 
banks were critical to overcome economic difficulties. 
9II. Designing a GIB that is Financially Sustainable
A GIB will need to be financially sustainable. But the meaning of financial sus-
tainability, that is, the way it can reproduce itself over time, is as much political 
as it is economic. By no means does financial sustainability necessarily mean 
the maximization of returns on investment. Indeed, financial sustainability can 
involve loss-making operations and highly subsidized programme lending—so 
long as the losses generated are covered by other return-generating lending 
within the bank or by direct government injections. There is no evidence that 
public banks must prioritise returns to be financially sustainable. Designing the 
GIB’s specific approach to financial sustainability, nevertheless, requires careful 
consideration of the sources of the GIB’s capital and the ways the GIB will lend 
out capital. 
II. A. Financial Sustainability
The design of any GIB must secure its financial sustainability, that is, its ability 
to reproduce the institution indefinitely in ways that allow the GIB to fulfil its 
mandate. While this does not mean maximising returns, it does mean securing 
sufficient and recurrent income to fulfil its mandate. It is important to under-
score here that financial sustainability can and must be pursued on par with 
the aim of enabling a green and just transition and democratic decision-making 
(that is, the triple bottom line). This approach to financial stability as but one 
of three functional pillars contrasts with private banks whose shareholders first 
and foremost demand a short-term focus on increased returns, whether or not 
this damages the environment or upholds democratic decision-making.
There is evidence that public development banks around the world function 
sustainably without having to earn high returns (see Table 1). German develop-
ment banks earn less than a third of a percent ROA (return on assets), France’s 
SFIL less than one tenth of a per cent ROA, and the Nordic Investment Bank 
(NIB; also see Box 2) over a half a percent ROA. Public investment banks in Chi-
na and Mexico earn around a half to three quarters of a percent ROA. These are 
each successful and well-regarded public banks.
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That said, existing public banks in the USA tend to earn higher returns. The 
NADB earns over one percent ROA and the BND over two percent ROA, both 
of which are levels comparable or better than private commercial banks like 
Wells Fargo, HSBC, or Citibank. The point is that public banks can function sus-
tainably with either very low or high returns. There is no universal limit one way 
or another. The more important political question is what a public bank does to 
function sustainably at low rates of returns, or what it does with returns gener-
ated at a higher rate.
BOX 2: THE NORDIC INVESTMENT BANK: CREDIBLE AND GREEN 
The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB, established 1975) is a development policy-oriented 
public bank that is not owned and controlled by a single government, but by eight—
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The NIB is guided by a vision for ‘a prosperous and sustainable Nordic-Baltic region’, 
operationalised via its mandate to support projects that improve resource efficiency; 
the development of a competitive low carbon economy; protection of the environ-
ment and its ecosystem; and the development of clean technology. In the words of the 
NIB, the bank needs to be ‘financially strong’ in order to fulfil its mandate effectively 
while at the same time generating sufficient returns on operations to provide its public 
owners a ‘reasonable return’ (NIB 2017, 57). To this end, the NIB funds both private and 
public projects, but reports that the largest portion of lending goes to municipal infra-
structure (schools, healthcare facilities, water and wastewater systems). Much of this 
infrastructure lending crosscuts with the NIB’s environmental mandate.
The NIB was not founded with a ‘green’ mandate, however, it was a relatively early 
mover when it started targeting environmental lending in 1988. By 1997 the NIB had 
established a new environmental loan facility and then, in 2001, it joined the Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), which is meant to overcome barriers 
to transboundary environmental issues. The NIB has signed the Declaration on the 
European Principles for the Environment (EPE), which addresses environmental man-
agement in the financing of projects and reports to the Global Reporting Initiative 
(which tracks environmental impacts). In performing these functions, the bank is seen 
as a socially credible institution. In a 2015 independent survey of 12 stakeholders (cus-
tomers, investors, and public authorities), respondents strongly perceived the bank as 
ethical, transparent, and effective particularly with regard to sustainability issues (NIB 
2017, 10).
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What a public bank does with its returns will depend on its legal mandate. In 
cases like Germany’s KfW, all returns go back into the bank’s capital reserves 
to enable further lending. By contrast, the Bank of North Dakota distributes 
its returns by either sending them to the State of North Dakota Legislature’s 
General Fund, using them for mandated loan programs, or adding to the 
BND’s capital. In yet another example, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo 
Comunal (BPDC) of Costa Rica uses higher-return activities to cross-subsi-
dise the bank’s loss-making social activities. Any one of these strategies can 
be financially sustainable, and if mandated to do so, can be consistent with a 
triple bottom line.
To be sure, it is also the case that public development banks can generate an-
nual losses in the fulfilment of their mandated activities and/or for extending 
counter-cyclical lending at times of financial crisis (although cases of public 
banks with annual losses are now the exception than the rule) (see De Lu-
na-Martinez et al. 2018, 33). In such cases, the responsible government covers 
the losses incurred due to such mandated lending activities. When performed 
in line with mandated activities, this too is a form of financial sustainability. The 
bank can reproduce itself indefinitely. Importantly given the scale and timeline 
of investments envisioned as part of the Green New Deal, it is likely that the US 
Government will need to subsidise GIB activities in this way in order to accom-
plish the proposed transformation. As with the original New Deal, so too with 
the Green New Deal—the financial sustainability of a GIB will depend on politi-
cal will and popular demand.
The point is that financial sustainability means having sufficient annual in-
come—be it from its own earnings or from government transfers—to cover 
Table 1: Development Bank Return on Assets, Annual, 2017 and 2018
KfW
(Germany)
NRW
(Germany)
SFIL
(France)
NIB
(Nordic region)
CDB
(China)
NAFIN
(Mexico)
BPDC NADB
(USA/Mexico)
BND
2017 0.29 0.01 0.07 0.70 0.81 0.30 1.1 1.48 2.03
2018 0.34 0.01 0.09 0.56 0.75 0.46 0.61 1.03 2.26
Source: Orbis/Bankscope 2019 (accessed 11 June 2019).
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annual expenses, including any losses—nothing more, nothing less. When 
public banks generate returns, these can be used to bolster the bank’s capital 
reserves, paid to its government owners, or some combination therein. When 
they generate losses, either internal or external sources must cover them for 
the institution to persist.
The key political economic decision to be made in deciding on the design of 
financial sustainability is the balance between concessionary lending (that is, 
not-for-profit and loss-making operations) and non-concessionary lending 
(that is, for-profit) (cf. Cochran et al. 2015). Moreover, who and what benefits, 
or not, from such concessionary lending? There are no natural answers; they 
must follow from the bank’s public interest mandate and triple bottom line. As 
discussed below, these too will need to be democratically determined to be 
green and just.
This proposed approach to financial stability breaks from conventional eco-
nomic thinking. For example, international institutions like the World Bank, 
World Economic Forum, and the OECD want public banks to socialize the 
investment risks of private finance in order to drive green transformation 
(WEF 2006; World Bank 2012; OECD 2017). Therein, public banks should only 
fund so-called “bankable” projects, that is, ones expected to generate 
positive returns for the bank. This mainstream strategy would 
both further empower private financial capital (and under-
mine public capacity to drive forward with a Green New 
deal) and eliminate funding possibilities for the many 
necessary climate mitigation and protection strategies 
due to profitability (bankability) constraints. Moreover, 
current mainstream strategies are unable to account 
for a triple bottom line as they by design elevate maxi-
mising returns above all other considerations.
“
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II. B. Sourcing Finance Capital for a Green and Just Transition
The design of a GIB for a green and just transition in the public interest must 
consider carefully its sources of finance capital. Two matters need considering: 
(a) its initial capitalization and (b) future recurrent sources.
Initial capitalization
The initial capitalization of the GIB, or how much capital will need to be inject-
ed into the new bank to get it up and running, must be decided in relation to 
the scope of activities planned for the bank. The initial injection should neither 
be too small that the GIB cannot achieve its short to medium-term targets or 
too large that money sits idle and ineffective, ultimately undermining the finan-
cial sustainability and societal credibility of the GIB.
There are two common strategies for the initial capitalization of equity capi-
tal. First, the GIB could issue a start-up equity tranche for a specific amount 
(say, for example, $50 billion) that would be bought by the US government 
(hence, injecting capital directly into the GIB). Or second, the GIB could 
mirror strategies adopted in Europe and with the new multilateral develop-
ment banks (the AIIB and New Development Bank) where public banks have 
a mix of paid-in capital (actual cash in hand) and “callable” capital. Here the 
government’s actual cash injection is a fraction (anywhere from 10 to 50 per 
cent) of the total subscribed capital (say, again for illustration purposes, a 
total of $50 billion). That is, the government would inject $5 billion to $25 
billion and guarantee as “callable” by the Board of Directors the remaining 
$25 billion to $45 billion as and when needed. The advantage of the sec-
ond approach is that the GIB can kick off operations while drawing less from 
government resources. For example, the NADB is capitalized in equal parts 
by the governments of the United States and Mexico. The NADB has $6 bil-
lion in total capital subscribed equally by the United States and Mexico. 
Contributions to date total $415 million in paid-in capital and $2.35 billion in 
callable capital.4
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Much like the other public banks, the GIB can mobilize various other financial 
sources and use loans paid back for extending new credit. There are no inher-
ent barriers to a GIB being both financially sustainable and serving the purpose 
of a green and just transition. 
Recurrent sources of finance capital
Once initially capitalised, a GIB, like all public banks, will require constant flows 
of incoming capital in order to fund its mandated projects and activities. The 
potential sources of this incoming capital can have different impacts on a pub-
lic bank’s ability to fulfil its mandate and pursue a triple bottom line. 
As a principle of design, a GIB must ensure, whatever its source of recurrent 
capital, that incoming capital resources enable, rather than undermine, the 
bank’s ability to fulfil its green and just transition mandate in the public inter-
est. One strategy is to ensure that the bank’s primary source of finance capital 
is public in origin (Romero 2017). Recurrent public sources can include direct 
government allocations, types of permanent capitalization from public institu-
tions and workers, and foreign public borrowing (See Box 3). 
In terms of permanent capitalization, we need to think creatively about potential 
public sources of capital that need not involve borrowing at all (cf. OECD 2017, 
4). For example, non-borrowed sources of public capital can come from transfers 
linked to a dedicated percentage of tax revenues received by various levels of 
government (local; state; national); official grants; and injections from other pub-
lic sector entities. Some less conventional but innovative “green” sources include 
carbon levies and taxes; emissions trading revenues; and utility bill or energy effi-
ciency surcharges. These can all contribute to the cumulative build-up of a GIB’s 
financial capacity in ways that support its pursuit of a triple bottom line.
While never eliminating potential conflicts, public sources of capital can better 
enable long-term horizons and reduce short-term demands for higher returns. 
Indeed, it is precisely this failed neoliberal model that has helped regenerate 
interest in public banks. A recent European Commission report acknowledges 
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that private investment is driven first and foremost by expected returns on 
investment, and thus favour investments with high return, short-term oppor-
tunities that neither support carbon-efficient technologies nor help to realise 
sustainability objectives (EPSC 2017, 12). Public banks that retain access to 
public money to generate stable, low-cost, and long-term forms of finance in 
the public interest can significantly reduce or eliminate these market pressures 
to maximizing profit over mandated priorities. With this in mind, publicly owned 
funding agencies in Nordic countries, such as Kommuninvest (Sweden), Kom-
munalbanken (Norway), Kommunekredit (Denmark), and MuniFin (Finland) 
have emerged as innovative pioneers of green lending and vital supporters 
of local development and infrastructure projects based on renewable energy, 
sustainable buildings, waste management, and environmental management. 
Despite lower ratios of return on assets, their ways of pooling finance and 
distributing to local communities are exemplary and sustainable. Such a push 
BOX 3: RECURRENT SOURCES OF FINANCE CAPITAL
Direct government allocations: Various government funds for public banks; includes 
initial capital allocations; annual allocations from the government budget. Special 
government funds for development priorities (e.g., SMEs; farmers; trades; ‘green’ 
transformation) that are managed and administered by the bank; promotional and dis-
counted facilities for targeted bank loans supported by the government; government 
guarantees for programme lending; quasi-equity capital, involving long-term govern-
ment loans that are highly subsidized (e.g., at zero or low rates of interest) and whose 
repayment may involve grace periods. 
Permanent public capitalisation: State, municipal, local authority contributions; ‘green’ 
contributions from essential services and infrastructure (water; electricity; energy; trans-
portation); worker contributions.
Foreign public borrowing: Sources include the international financial agencies (World 
Bank Group; regional development banks); foreign governments; foreign develop-
ment agencies.
Private borrowing: Domestic and international capital markets; bond markets; green 
bonds; private institutional investors.
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for green lending is no longer specific to Nordic public banks. As of 2018, 80 
per cent of the members of the European Association of Public Banks provid-
ed finance to green projects (EAPB, 2018). The curtailing of private financial 
profit-maximising imperatives is a vital element of any long-term green trans-
formational strategy conceived of in the public interest.
Moreover, public–public collaborations can assist the GIB in protecting a public 
interest mandate, in helping to develop a broader public ethos in society, and in 
reclaiming public sector expertise and capacity—that is, public collaborations 
can help to generate a new breed of effective and democratically responsive 
pubic service providers (see Hanna 2018 and McDonald 2018). In line with the 
triple bottom line, public sources of finance capital have the right to participate 
in how the bank operates. That is, no public monetary contribution without 
meaningful representation. As elaborated below, this democratic structure co-
incides with the demands made within Green New Deal legislation.
Private borrowing can also provide an important source of recurrent finance 
capital. This will mean tapping into global financial markets, which can provide 
near limitless access to capital. The sovereign state guarantee given to a GIB 
will mean the bank can access capital at the most favourable rates and terms. 
The GIB can issue green bonds and resort to global financial markets, not re-
lying solely on private financial capital to fund projects of public good. This is 
already underway. The volume of the bond market aligned with climate change 
reached $1.45 trillion in 2018 and green bonds are estimated to have reached 
the volume of $389 billion (Climate Bonds, 2018). The United States takes its 
place among the countries dominating the issuance of climate-aligned bonds 
(Weber and Saravade 2019). 
Global growth of green finance will continue and the GIB can benefit from op-
portunities to borrow cheap in the international financial markets. As a principle 
of design, however, it must be enshrined in the bank’s operations that any sourc-
ing of private capital does not undermine the bank’s mandate, public ethos, or 
triple bottom line. Rather than “financializing” the GIB balance sheet (that is, in-
tensifying short-term accumulation imperatives), the GIB must structure private 
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borrowing in ways that “definancializes” the capital borrowed (that is, sanitizes 
and eliminates private interest imperatives) (see Tricarico 2015).
This is important because if a public bank is largely dependent on short-term, 
return-maximising, and volatile private sources of capital this dynamic could 
undermine the ability and autonomy of the public bank to pursue its public 
interest mandate, especially if private interests conflict with a triple bottom 
line. Private finance can engage in “capital strikes” (withholding new capital 
or calling in existing loan commitments) and are structurally pro-cyclical in 
their lending behaviour. The effect would be to drastically reduce the GIB’s 
capacity to fulfil its mandate, or to bend its green mandate so that it is more 
aligned with or subordinated to private interests and capital accumulation. By 
contrast, a good foundation of public capital and a sovereign backing, guar-
anteeing support should it be required to fulfil its mandate and triple bottom 
line, places a public bank firmly within a public interest framework and en-
ables democratic accountability.
The point here is not that public banks must avoid sourcing capital from pri-
vate financial markets. Not at all. There are very good reasons for public banks 
to help definancialise contemporary financial markets by channelling capital 
into public interest projects. It is rather that a public GIB must be strategic 
in sourcing capital so that the bank’s public interest mandate and 
triple bottom line are protected.
Lending for a Green and Just Transition
The design of a GIB must also consider carefully how it 
will lend for a green and just transition. Financial in-
stitutions, public and private, lend money for a price, 
which is the cost of borrowing. The cost or price of 
borrowing for clients involves several factors. How much 
interest does the bank itself have to pay to access sourc-
es of loanable capital? What are the operating costs of the 
bank (staff, IT, real estate)? The price of borrowing will be 
“ 
A public GIB must be 
strategic in sourcing 
capital so that the bank’s 
public interest mandate 
and triple bottom line are 
protected.
”
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reflected in the interest rate, as well as in any fees or commissions charged by 
the bank. Yet, as discussed above, what a bank actually demands in return for 
providing a loan or financial support can be concessional or non-concessional. 
The price of lending may or may not fully reflect the cost of providing it. 
It follows that no lending or investment strategy is socially neutral but is in-
stead deeply political in its economic and social implications. Whereas private 
and corporatized financial institutions lend only to so-called “bankable” proj-
ects (that is, projects expected to earn enough money in the future to repay 
their debts plus the full costs of borrowing that include profit imperatives) and 
thus have a single “bottom-line” based on returns, a public interest public bank 
will have more options. Projects may or may not be “bankable”. Returns may 
form but one of several bottom-lines. It is a matter of design and political (not 
simply economic) imperatives.
In designing a GIB with a triple bottom line, there is a wide range of appropri-
ate financial instruments that can be used to invest and allocate its financial 
resources. These include everything from offering a variety of repayable loans 
to facilitating directed funds from third parties (official donors or green inves-
tors), to offering targeted grants, to even taking a direct ownership stake (equity 
investment), or to providing technical assistance and engaging in public–public 
sector collaborations (cf. I4CE 2018, 13). Subject to oversight and scrutiny, these 
ways of lending and channelling money can be consistent with a triple bottom 
line, thus facilitating, rather than undermining, a green and just transformation. 
There are, however, a number of lending instruments that are clearly inconsis-
tent with a triple-bottom-line design. For example, any financial strategy that 
involves project risk sharing agreements where the public bank guarantees pri-
vate investor profitability (which is the strategy advocated by the World Bank’s 
Billions to Trillions SDG agenda, see World Bank/IMF 2015) is inconsistent with 
a triple bottom line and the public interest. That is, it is a dead end to begin a 
just transition by first socialising the risks of investment by ensuring the priva-
tisation of profits. A second closely related and inconsistent strategy involves 
the promotion of public-private partnerships. Here public authorities facilitate 
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BOX 4: WAYS OF LENDING FOR GREEN AND JUST TRANSITION
Standard loans:  
Must be repaid by the borrower, at concessional or non-concessional rates.
Development loans:  
Often are concessional and repayable, but may blend sources of government or 
donor funds.
Official donors:  
Provide directed funding that is channelled through the GIB as an intermediary.
Grants, transfers, and subsidies:  
Do not need to be repaid, and may be tied to government or donor programming.
Equity:  
Involves the GIB taking a direct ownership stake in a project or company.
Public-public collaborations:  
Involves public-sector collaborations in undertaking public works where ownership and 
debt risks are shared within the public sector.
Technical assistance:  
Involves agreements to provide supportive expertise and assistance at little or no cost 
to the recipient.
Green bonds:  
Involves the GIB providing financial instruments for investors who want to specifically 
channel their funds directly into certified sustainable development projects.
infrastructure and essential service provisioning by the private sector. Public 
banks do so by taking on investment risks and helping to guarantee profitable 
returns for corporations. Yet these PPPs are fraught with problems, typically 
driving up infrastructure costs to the public sector while eroding any sense of 
democratic decision-making and accountability (Eurodad 2018). Lending for a 
green and just transformation must, and can, do better.
20
III. Connecting a GIB to local public 
banks and communities
A founding commitment of the Green New Deal is that it “must be developed 
through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership 
with frontline and vulnerable communities, labour unions, worker cooperatives, 
civil society groups, academia, and businesses.” [see Section (3)]. So too with 
any new GIB, which must institutionalise ways of functioning and co-existing 
collaboratively with regional and local public banks and their communities. 
The connection can be made according to a principle of “subsidiarity”, wherein 
socioeconomic decisions are “handed to the smallest political unit capable of 
discharging them” (see Basu 2019). The structure of this hub-and-spoke system 
need not be complex, but it does need to meaningfully enable, not undermine, 
the fulfilment of a triple bottom line (see Diagram 2).
DIAGRAM 2: ENVISIONING A HUB/SPOKE GIB SYSTEM
Green 
Investment 
Bank
Local  
Public  
Banks
Regional 
Public  
Banks
Communities
Cooperative 
Banks
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Quite simply, the GIB should sit at the hub of a national system of regional pub-
lic development banks that in turn work collaboratively with communities and 
their local public and cooperative banks. In this way, the funding of a green and 
just transition can benefit from working within and across different scales while 
benefiting from (and respecting) local knowledge and socio-economic priorities.
There are significant functional benefits to this hub/spoke system. The GIB can 
access large amounts of cheaper finance capital at national and internation-
al levels, in turn supplying regional banks with stable and affordable loanable 
capital. This in turn is passed on to local banks and communities. 
As the national hub, moreover, the GIB can tackle the largest investment proj-
ects that are beyond the capacity of the smaller regional banks. The GIB would 
take responsibility for being the central hub of expertise, capacity-building, and 
training around the vast complexities of a green and just transition. This would 
include organising internal capacity-building and advancement opportunities 
for staff as well as coordinating external higher education staff training pro-
grammes. The national hub would also be the place to locate a public banking 
association designed to represent and defend the public interest benefits of 
public banks to government and society.
Regional development banks will work within a smaller geographically defined 
region, drawing on national GIB financial and technical resources to fulfil re-
gional investment priorities. Being closer to the projects on the ground, the 
regional banks will facilitate respect for the full spectrum of the triple bottom 
line. As the middle-level bank, the regional banks can enable dialogue and deci-
sion-making between local banks and communities and the national GIB.
In turn, local public and cooperative banks will be responsible for everyday 
financial services and for rolling out green transition programmes at the com-
munuity and household scales. As retail banks, these banks will specialise in 
understanding the needs of the community and then representing these needs 
to the regional and national levels. Importantly, as deposit-taking institutions, 
people and communities can decide to hold their savings here knowing that 
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these sources of capital will support a green and just transition in the public 
interest as opposed to highly concentrated individual wealth accumulation. 
The design of this hub and spoke institutional structure, which is not dissimilar 
to that employed in the German model of public banking, must be forceful-
ly representative, accountable, and democratic across and through all three 
scales. More is said on this below. What needs to be emphasised here, however, 
is that finance in this structure can be a force for societal integration and the 
public interest, rather than a source of community disintegration and driver 
of grotesque private fortunes—as is the case under neoliberal financialization. 
Research shows that public banks, like other public institutions, can practice 
non-competitive cooperation as a matter of mandate and good practice in 
ways that promote common efficiencies and the public interest over private 
accumulation (see Butzbach 2016; Périlleux and Nyssens 2017; Kishimoto and 
Petitjean 2017; Marois 2013 and 2017; Steinfort and Kishimoto 2019). The pro-
posal made here can enable the efficiencies and resources available at the 
national scale to appropriately support “community-defined projects and strat-
egies” in ways consistent with a Green New Deal.
IV. Democratizing a GIB for a Just Transition
For a new GIB to be anything other than just another financial institution cap-
tured by wealthy financial elites and private interests, it must move beyond 
corporatized “governance” models to being meaningfully democratized. Only 
through purposively designed democratization can a GIB fulfil a green and just 
transition for all in ways that stop current, prevent future, and repair historic 
oppressions and systemic injustices, as called for in the New Green Deal.
Democratization means internalising and acknowledging the already-existing 
connections (and disparities) between society, politics, and economics in in-
stitutional decision-making such that they are transparent and accountable to 
the affected community. In the case of a new GIB, the democratization chal-
lenge is to strategize how to align national operations with regional and local 
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representatives within national and local development plans (see Romero 
2017, 15). We recommend applying the principle of subsidiarity by attempting 
to devolve decisions while also designing means of multi-scalar representa-
tion across the hub/spoke model. Therein, democratic forces must be able 
to protect against public banks being abused by powerful public and pri-
vate sector elites for their own interests. In this, neoliberal market-based 
governance models have not proven effective, as efficiency and profitability 
imperatives have served as trojan horses for subordinating the public to the 
private interest. Meaningful democratization, therefore, is the only viable 
strategy able to armour a GIB against undue and undemocratic abuse and 
capture for private interests.
The design need not be overly complex, but it must be well-crafted and robust. 
Drawing from existing public banking practices, we suggest crafting a democ-
ratization structure that combines both inclusive and representative elements 
in its institutional structure (we will here discuss this in terms of a national GIB, 
but the ideas and principles should extend to the regional and local public 
banks as well).
The GIB should be designed with a two-level but hierarchical democratization 
structure formally composed of a People’s Assembly and a National Board of 
DIAGRAM 3: DEMOCRATIZATION STRUCTURE OF 
A GREEN INVESTMENT BANK 
People’s Assembly 
Permanent Commissions 
(e.g., Women’s; Tribal Nations)
National Board of Directors
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Directors. The People’s Assembly forms the highest decision-making body and 
the institution’s most inclusive forum. While its precise responsibilities must be 
debated, and spelled out in public law, it is meant to provide the overall vi-
sion for the GIB and guarantee democratic oversight and accountability of the 
bank’s overall operations with respect to its mandate. The People’s Assembly 
would, for example, review and approve annual reports, but it would not involve 
itself in more technical and managerial operational decisions—unless request-
ed to do so by the National Board of Directors. Designed more in the form of 
annual meetings, the Assembly is not geared towards intervening in the day-to-
day business of the bank. 
There is no pre-set specific number of Assembly representatives required, as 
this must be determined in the make-up of the GIB. However, as a matter of 
principle and to enable broad-based representation of the people, Assembly 
numbers should presumably be more than one hundred. All members would 
be elected by designated constituencies and social sectors representing, for 
example, trade unions, teachers and educators, environmentalists, SMEs and 
cooperatives, public services, and anchor institutions. To enable bottom-up 
representation and dialogue across the hub/spoke scales, the Assembly would 
also include representatives from the regional and local public banks.
The People’s Assembly would be the location designated for Permanent Com-
missions to reside. Permanent commissions are specialist bodies responsible 
for ensuring that GIB operations are consistent with social equity priorities, 
such as women’s equality and Indigenous rights. Commissions would be 
responsible for reviewing core decisions and mandates. The Commissions’ deci-
sions must have a meaningful impact on the decisions of the Assembly and the 
Board. Specific examples of possible Commission may include a Women’s and/
or Tribal Commission. 
A real-world precedent for the proposed People’s Assembly and Permanent 
Commissions democratic structure is the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Co-
munal (Bank of the People and of Community Development) in Costa Rica 
(established in 1969). While initially founded around a traditional ‘Board’-led 
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decision-making model, the Banco Popular legally established a new “Work-
ers’ Assembly” as the bank’s highest decision-making body in 1986. In 2002 
the Banco Popular re-affirmed this decision and further specified the purpose 
and democratic ethos of the Workers’ Assembly in its new “Democratization 
Law” (the Ley de Democratización de las Instancias del Decisión del BPDC y de 
Desarrollo Comunal). By law, the Banco Popular’s Workers’ Assembly is made 
up of 290 representatives drawn from ten social and economic sectors in Costa 
Rica (artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; independent; teachers; 
professional; as well as the confederated, non-confederated, and solidarity 
syndicates). For observers of Costa Rican society, the Workers’ Assembly is the 
foundation of the bank’s contribution to the democratization of Costa Rica’s 
economy, development, and financial system (Cortés 2014, 62). The Democ-
ratization Law further specifies that the BPDC have a Permanent Commission 
for Women and that the Worker’s Assembly must act on the Commission’s 
requests. Local branches of the Banco Popular also have local representatives 
holding the branch to account for its activities. Consequently, the Banco Popu-
lar is, in our opinion, the most democratic bank in the world—and there is much 
to learn from this ambitious and evolving project.
The GIB’s second highest decision-making body, subordinated in structure to 
the People’s Assembly, is the National Board of Directors. Unlike the People’s 
Assembly, the National Board will be tasked with managing and coordinating 
GIB operations and with implementing the vision of the People’s Assembly. It is 
more likely to require monthly meetings. As with the People’s Assembly, there is 
no pre-set number of board members, but as a matter of principle it should be 
in the dozens to ensure substantive representation and to guard against institu-
tional capture by any particular grouping. Here one could look to the promising 
example of the large German public development bank, the KfW. Its Supervisory 
Board is chaired by the elected Federal Minister of Finance and Federal Minister 
for Economic Affairs and Energy in alternation and it includes an additional 37 
representatives from across several social and economic sectors.5
National Board membership should follow a tripartite model, including gov-
ernment- and parliament-assigned delegates (national; state; and municipal); 
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People’s Assembly delegates representative of social sectors; and regional 
and local public bank delegates. This Board-level form of representative de-
mocratization should translate into public ownership offering effective popular 
democratic control over the managerial, strategic, and operational direction of 
the public bank, while remaining subordinate to the People’s Assembly’s vision 
and direction.
We recommend combining the representative and inclusive forms of rep-
resentation within the GIB in order to provide substantive democratized 
oversight and accountability, which can then enable the bank to function 
credibly in the public interest. The design of democratization here is not 
meant to ‘depoliticize’ the bank’s decision-making processes (as per neoliber-
al governance models) but rather to insulate the GIB from individual political 
and corporate capture by opening bank processes up to broad-based demo-
cratic deliberation. 
BOX 5: GERMANY’S KFW:  
DEMOCRACY AS A CAUSAL FORCE OF GREEN TRANSITION
The democratic structure of the KfW has enabled the linking of German society’s green 
aspirations to KfW lending operations. Germany’s “Energiewende” (energy transition) 
initiative, which has “strong roots within civil society based on energy cooperatives, 
private investors, farmers, and a broad consensus on the advantages of a renewable-en-
ergy regime” (Haas and Sander 2016, 125), was formalised in a series of laws since 2000. 
These include the Renewable Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and Climate 
Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative (2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). 
The KfW’s public ownership structure and democratic Board membership then trans-
lated these initiatives into a new environmental mandate for the KfW. This triggered 
changes in the bank’s lending practices. Presently, “green” lending, which leads to a 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and to increased energy efficiency, accounts for 
40 to 45 per cent of all KfW lending (KfW 2017, 2; KfW 2019, 3). Since 2014 the KfW 
has become active in issuing green bonds. While having some way to go, the KfW is 
moving in a promising direction.
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Three additional principles must complement the bank’s democratization struc-
ture: the right to collective action, transparency, and accountability. As a matter 
of human rights and dignity, the GIB must institutionally uphold a worker’s right 
to self-organize into unions and to take collective action (that is, to strike). 
Presently the right to strike for bank workers is not guaranteed by all banks, 
public or private, around the world. Yet any institution’s public interest mandate 
is fatally undermined if its own employees cannot exercise their basic human 
rights, articulate their own collective interests, or hold management to account 
for violations to the bank’s mandate. 
Democratization, moreover, must be backed by robust transparency and ac-
countability mechanisms that guarantee open communication, feedback, and 
inclusive decision-making processes. This means directly challenging existing 
international financial practices that accept bank secrecy and impunity. What a 
bank does must be openly held to account. Transparency, in this case, means 
having the legal and substantive right to access information held by public 
banks and by public authorities on public banks (Romero 2017, 23). As best 
practice, public banks must be required to disclose all key documentation, to 
detail their clients, sub-clients, and end-users, and to provide accessible and 
verifiable annual reports. To be meaningful, transparency needs to be written 
into contractual funding agreements. Burdensome administrative processes 
for accessing such documents must be eliminated by making key documents 
openly available online to all. 
At the same time, affected communities must have regular access to open 
decision-making forums to be able to hold all decision-makers accountable. 
Internally, public banking institutions require a user-friendly and independent 
complaints procedure that protects complainants and whistle-blowers. To 
meaningfully link transparency and accountability, public banks have to for-
mally allocate annual resources for regular and independent evaluations of the 
banks’ operations. The bank’s green mandate must be included in these mecha-
nisms, for example, by reporting externally to organisations like the GRI (Global 
Reporting Initiative6), which highlights sustainability criteria.
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Conclusion
People make history if never in the conditions of their own choosing. Collec-
tively we must face climate change and the disasters it is bringing as a result of 
human activity, exacerbated by the exploitative, productivist, and consump-
tion-driven nature of capitalism. People have a chance to change the future. 
Finance will be at the forefront of this change, for better or for worse. It is a 
choice society must make. The current trajectory will see finance subordinate 
the climate agenda to ensuring a greater concentration of wealth in fewer 
hands. A different but democratized trajectory can result in finance being ori-
ented towards a green and just future.
Our analysis underlines that it is not only possible but vital to have a green 
public investment bank in the US, to democratize finance, and to support the 
public good. Green transition can be achieved sustainably and justly without 
the burden falling disproportionately upon the working and the poor in society. 
A GIB can make use of alternative sources of finance, channel resources effec-
tively, learn from successful green lending projects, and itself be a model for 
collaborative initiatives to green the economy. In order to do so, the GIB must 
be connected to local banks and communities and work with them account-
ably and transparently. By democratizing the GIB, it is possible to have a green 
and just financial institution that is both commanded by and working for the 
public good.
Neither words nor critique alone can realise this alternative trajectory. Workers, 
women, the poor, the marginalised, and the 99 per cent must build actually ex-
isting institutional financial capacity and subordinate these public financial 
institutions to the public interest and to democratic decision-making. No doubt 
this means charting new territory and breaking with neoliberalism. The path 
is not without historical precedent or future necessity. But as we confront the 
structures of global financial capital, the struggle for something better must be 
ambitious, bold, and creative. 
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